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Abstract. Monitoring location updates from mobile users has important appli-
cations in many areas, ranging from public safety and national security to social
networks and advertising. However, sensitive information can be derived from
movement patterns, thus protecting the privacy of mobile users is a major con-
cern. Users may only be willing to disclose their locations when some condi-
tion is met, for instance in proximity of a disaster area or an event of interest.
Currently, such functionality can be achieved using searchable encryption. Such
cryptographic primitives provide provable guarantees for privacy, and allow de-
cryption only when the location satisfies some predicate. Nevertheless, they rely
on expensive pairing-based cryptography (PBC), of which direct application to
the domain of location updates leads to impractical solutions.
We propose secure and efficient techniques for private processing of location up-
dates that complement the use of PBC and lead to significant gains in perfor-
mance by reducing the amount of required pairing operations. We implement two
optimizations that further improve performance: materialization of results to ex-
pensive mathematical operations, and parallelization. We also propose an heuris-
tic that brings down the computational overhead through enlarging an alert zone
by a small factor (given as system parameter), therefore trading off a small and
controlled amount of privacy for significant performance gains. Extensive exper-
imental results show that the proposed techniques significantly improve perfor-
mance compared to the baseline, and reduce the searchable encryption overhead
to a level that is practical in a computing environment with reasonable resources,
such as the cloud.
Keywords: Location Privacy, Searchable Encryption
1 Introduction
Modern mobile devices with positioning capabilities (e.g., GPS) allow users to be in-
formed about events that occur in their proximity. Many classes of applications benefit
from the large-scale availability of location data, ranging from public safety and na-
tional security to social networks and advertising. One particular scenario of interest is
that of location-based alert systems, where mobile users wish to be immediately noti-
fied when their current location satisfies some conditions, expressed as a spatial search
predicate. For instance, in a public safety scenario, users want to be notified when they
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are getting close to a dangerous accident area. Alternatively, in the commercial domain,
a user may want to be alerted when a nearby sale event is underway.
The typical architecture of such a system uses a server that collects location updates
from the users and checks whether the alert condition is met. Such a service is often pro-
vided by a commercial entity that is not fully trusted. The collection of user trajectories
at a commercial site introduces serious privacy concerns, as sensitive personal infor-
mation may be derived from a person’s whereabouts [16, 20]. Therefore, protecting the
privacy of users is a necessary feature of such a system, and the users must not report
their exact locations to the server. Ideally, the only information that the server should be
able to derive from the user updates is whether the conditions that the users subscribe to
are satisfied or not. Syntactic privacy models [15,17,20,34] that perform generalization
of locations before sharing have been proven vulnerable, especially in the presence of
background knowledge [16]. Furthermore, semantic privacy models such as differen-
tial privacy [9, 11, 12] are only suitable for releasing statistics, but not for processing
privately individual updates.
Recently, several advanced encryption functions that allow evaluation of predicates
on ciphertexts have been proposed [2, 6, 30]. These functions are broadly referred to as
searchable encryption (SE) functions, since they allow the evaluation of certain types
of queries without requiring decryption. Some of these encryption systems are asym-
metric, i.e., they employ a secret key SK and a public key PK pair.
Figure 1 shows the envisioned system architecture, with three types of entities: (i)
users who send encrypted location updates using the PK of a trusted authority; (ii) a
trusted authority (TA) who generates tokens for spatial search predicates using secret
key SK; and (iii) the server (S) that collects location updates from users and evaluates
the predicates on the ciphertexts using the tokens. In practice, the TA may represent
the public emergency department of a city, which is responsible for the safety of the
citizens. The TA is trusted, but it does not have the necessary infrastructure to support
a large-scale alert system, hence it outsources this service to S.
However, S is a commercial entity that cannot be trusted with user locations, so the
TA sets up a SK/PK pair, and distributes PK to the users. When an emergency occurs
in a region, the TA creates a search token which is sent to S to be matched against
the ciphertexts received from users. The properties of SE guarantee that S is able to
evaluate the predicate on the ciphertext (e.g., whether the user location is enclosed in
the region encoded by the search token) and learns only if the ciphertext matches or not,
but no other information about user location.
Fig. 1: Location-based Alert System
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To understand search on encrypted data, it helps to consider each ciphertext as be-
ing composed of two parts: an encrypted index I and encrypted message M . M is the
payload of the ciphertext, just the same as in the case of conventional encryption. The
novel part about searchable encryption is the presence of the index I , which is used for
search, and can be seen as a parameter of the encryption function EPK(I,M). When a
user ui constructs its update, she uses her current coordinates (Xi, Yi) as index, and per-
forms encryption asEPK((Xi, Yi),Mi). If the index satisfies the predicate specified by
a token, then the server is able to recover the message Mi from the user. However, this
does not imply that S can find the exact user location, as Mi may contain information
that is of other nature (e.g., an emergency contact number).
One prominent approach to searchable encryption called Hidden Vector Encryption
(HVE) was proposed in [6]. HVE can evaluate exact match, range and subset queries on
ciphertexts. HVE uses bilinear maps on groups of composite order [19] as mathemat-
ical foundation and makes extensive use of expensive operations such as bilinear map
pairings. As a result, HVE is very expensive and scales poorly. Later in Section 6, we
show that in order to process the update from a single user only, it may take up to 100
seconds. Clearly, direct application of HVE for alert systems is not suitable.
In this paper, we propose secure and efficient techniques to support private location-
based alert systems using searchable encryption. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study of applying asymmetric searchable encryption to the domain of private
search with spatial predicates. Our specific contributions are1:
i. We devise specific constructions that allow application of HVE to the problem of
location-based alert systems with a reduced number of bilinear pairing operations,
thus lowering the computational overhead of HVE.
ii. We develop optimizations based on reuse of expensive mathematical operation re-
sults and parallelization, which further reduce the HVE performance overhead.
iii. We introduce a novel heuristic algorithm that provides effective means to tune
the privacy-performance trade-off of the system, by allowing enlargement of alert
zones by a small factor. By carefully enlarging the alert zone, one can obtain search
tokens that require significantly smaller computation time to process.
iv. We perform an extensive experimental evaluation which shows that the proposed
approach brings the overhead of searchable encryption to acceptable levels in a
computing environment such as the cloud.
Section 2 overviews the proposed system and HVE. Section 3 presents the encoding
techniques for efficient application of HVE, whereas Section 4 outlines the optimiza-
tions to reduce execution time. In Section 5, we introduce the heuristic for privacy-
performance trade-off tuning through alert zone enlargement. Section 6 contains the
experimental evaluation results, followed by a survey of related research in Section 7.
Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and highlights directions for future work.
1 This submission is an extended version of [18]. Additional contributions consist of the tech-
nique for relaxation of alert zones presented in Section 5, and its evaluation in Section 6.4.
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Fig. 2: System Model (n = 2, m = 2, d = 8)
2 Background
2.1 System and Privacy Model
Figure 2 illustrates the location-based alert system model, where n users {u1, . . . , un}
move within a two-dimensional domain. Users continuously report their coordi-
nates and wish to be notified when their location falls within any of m alert zones
{z1, . . . , zm}. Alert zones (or simply zones) are defined by a trusted authority, as de-
tailed later in this section. For simplicity, we assume that the space is partitioned by a
regular grid of size d×d, and each alert zone covers a number of grid cells. To facilitate
presentation, we assume a square data domain, but our techniques can be immediately
extended to a rectangular one, by adjusting the grid cell shape. The functional require-
ment of the system follows the spatial range query semantics, i.e., a user u must receive
an alert corresponding to zone z if its location is enclosed by zone z.
The system (represented in Figure 1) consists of three types of entities:
i. Mobile Users subscribe to the alert system and periodically submit encrypted lo-
cation updates.
ii. The Trusted Authority (TA) is a trusted entity that decides which are the alert
zones, and creates for each zone a search token that allows to check privately if a
user location falls within the alert zone or not.
iii. The Server (S) is the provider of the alert system. It receives encrypted updates
from users and search tokens from TA, and performs the predicate evaluation
Match to decide whether encrypted location Ci(1 ≤ i ≤ n) falls within alert
zone j represented by token TKj(1 ≤ j ≤ m). If the predicate holds, Match
returns message Mi encrypted by the user, otherwise it returns a void message (⊥).
The privacy requirement dictates that the server must not learn any information
about the user locations, other than what can be derived from the match outcome, i.e.,
whether the user is in a particular alert zone or not. In case of a successful match, the
server S learns that user u is enclosed by zone z. In case of a non-match, the server S
learns only that the user is outside the zone z, but no additional location information.
Note that, this model is applicable to many real-life scenarios, such as our motivating
example in Section 1. For instance, users wish to keep their location private most of
the time, but they want to be immediately notified if they enter a zone where their
personal safety may be threatened. Furthermore, the extent of alert zones is typically
small compared to the entire data domain, so the fact that S learns that u is not within
the set of alert zones does not disclose significant information about u’s location.
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In practice, the TA role is played by an organization such as a city’s public emer-
gency department. Such an actor is trusted not to disclose SK and compromise user
privacy, but at the same time does not have the technological infrastructure to monitor
a large user population. Hence, the alert service is outsourced to a commercial entity,
e.g., a cloud provider that plays the role of the server. The TA will issue alert zones to
signal that certain areas of the city are affected by an emergency.
A private location-based alert system is also useful in social networks. A social net-
work user u can create a SK/PK pair and distribute PK to its buddies. Next, u creates
a token that represents his/her current location, e.g., a downtown restaurant. The net-
work provider (e.g., Facebook), plays the role of the server: it privately monitors users,
and sends the identifiers of buddies in the downtown area back to u. No information is
gained by the server about locations of non-matching users.
2.2 Searchable Encryption with HVE
(a) Match (b) Non-Match
Fig. 3: Predicate evaluation on ciphertexts with HVE
Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) [6] is a searchable encryption system that supports
predicates in the form of conjunctive equality, range and subset queries. Compared to
earlier solutions [3,5], HVE yields ciphertexts with considerably smaller length. Search
on ciphertexts can be performed with respect to a number of index attributes. HVE
represents an attribute as a bit vector (each element has value 0 or 1), and the search
predicate as a pattern vector where each element can be 0, 1 or ’*’ that signifies a wild-
card (or “don’t care”) value. Let l denote the HVE width, which is the bit length of the
attribute, and consequently that of the search predicate. A predicate evaluates to True
for a ciphertext C if the attribute vector I used to encrypt C has the same values as
the pattern vector of the predicate in all positions that are not ’*’ in the latter. Figure 3
illustrates the two cases of Match and Non-Match for HVE, whereas Algorithm 1 pro-
vides the matching pseudocode. We provide additional mathematical background on
HVE encryption and its operations in Appendix A.
3 Proposed Spatial HVE Approaches
In Section 3.1 we outline a naive baseline technique which applies HVE in a straightfor-
ward manner to determine privately which users fall within one or more alert zones. The
baseline leads to prohibitive costs, as shown by experiments in Section 6. To bring down
the overhead of HVE, we propose in Section 3.2 a hierarchical encoding technique,
which reduces the amount of cryptographic primitives (specifically, bilinear pairings)
required during search. Next, in Section 3.3 we further refine hierarchical encoding and
devise the Gray encoding, which achieves superior computation savings.
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Algorithm 1: HVE Match
Input : HVE index I = [I1 : Il]
Input : HVE token T = [T1 : Tl]
Output: True if I matches T , False otherwise
1 if ∀i ∈ [1 : l], Ii = Ti or Ti = ∗ then
2 return True
3 else
4 return False
Fig. 4: Naive Baseline Encoding
3.1 Baseline Encoding
Recall that the data space is partitioned by a two-dimensional d× d regular grid. When
a user reports its position, it sends to the server an encryption of the grid cell it is
enclosed by. Similarly, the TA defines the alert zones as a set of grid cells. Each grid
cell can be uniquely identified by a cell identifier, with values between 1 and d2. Thus,
the straightforward way to support secure location-based alerts is to use an HVE index
with width l = d2. The data and query encoding are performed as follows:
– When user u enclosed by grid cell i reports its location, it uses a bitmap index I of
width d2 where all the bits are set to ’0’ except bit i which is set to ’1’.
– The TA creates a single token for search, which captures all the alert zones. The
token is a bitmap with d2 bits where all bits corresponding to cell identifiers that
are included in an alert zone are set to ’*’. All other bits are set to ’0’.
– At the server (i.e., at query time), according to the rules for HVE query evaluation
from Section 2.2, a user will be determined as a Match if and only if the ’1’ bit in
the encrypted location will correspond to a ’*’ entry in the token.
Consider the example in Figure 4, where d = 3. We have nine grid cells, so the
width of the HVE is l = 9. There are two alert zones: z1 which consists of a single grid
cell (3), and z2 which spans two grid cells (8 and 9). Two users report their locations:
u1 enclosed by cell 1, and u2 enclosed by cell 8. The index vectors of the two users
are shown in the diagram. A single token is used to represent both alert zones, and a
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’*’ is placed in the positions corresponding to the cells enclosed by the zones, namely
3, 8 and 9. The predicate evaluation for u2 will return Match, as the position marked
by ’1’ in the index of u2 corresponds to a ’*’ in the token. Conversely, a Non-Match is
returned for u1, as the bit ’1’ in position 1 corresponds to a ’0’ in the token. Algorithm 2
provides the baseline encoding pseudocode.
Algorithm 2: Baseline Encoding
1 p = ID of grid cell enclosing user u
2 A = set of grid cell IDs that make up the alert zone
User u: Set I = [I1 : Id2 ], Ip = 1 and ∀i 6= p, Ii = 0
User u: Send encrypted I to Server S
TA : Set T = [T1 : Td2 ], Ti = ∗ if i ∈ A and Ti = 0 otherwise
TA : Send encrypted T to Server S
Server: If HV E Match(I, T ) = True, return Match
Server: Otherwise, return NotMatch
As discussed in Appendix A, Eq. (1) from the query step executes two pairing op-
erations and multiplies their results for every element in J , i.e., for every position that
is not ’*’ in the token. Having a token with one position for each grid cell leads to high
cost, so the naive encoding where the HVE width is equal to the number of cells is not
practical. Furthermore, the sum of areas of all alert zones is relatively small compared
to the entire dataspace, hence the number of ’*’ entries will be small, and the cardinality
of set J will be large, increasing cost. Next, we propose two effective forms of encoding
HVEs such that execution cost is reduced.
3.2 Hierarchical Encoding
The main problem of the baseline encoding is that the HVE width grows linearly with
the grid cell count. We propose a technique that reduces the HVE width from d2 to
2 log d, by using the binary representation of cell identifiers. However, the representa-
tion of the search predicates (and thus, that of the tokens) becomes more complicated,
since the advantage of the “bitmap-like” representation of the baseline is lost. We in-
vestigate how to aggregate representations of adjacent cells belonging to the same alert
zone, in order to reduce the amount of tokens required. Aggregation is performed ac-
cording to a hierarchical spatial structure, hence the name of hierarchical encoding.
We consider a logical organization of the grid cells into a quadtree-like structure2
[35]. Figure 5 illustrates the space partitioning into four cells of equal size by using
mediators on the Ox and Oy axes. Each of these four cells will have a 2-bit id: 00
for top left, 01 for bottom left, 10 for top right and 11 for bottom right. Next, each of
these cells is partitioned recursively into four new cells, and the newly obtained 2-bit
identifiers are concatenated as a suffix to the previous step identifiers. For simplicity, in
this example we consider that the grid cell count is a power of 4, but any grid size can
be accommodated in this model by using padding.
The diagram also shows how aggregation of cells from level j is performed into a
larger cell at level j+1 (i.e., in reverse direction of scoping). Note that, with the binary
2 Note that this is a logical structure, no physical index is required.
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Fig. 5: Hierarchical partitioning on three levels
representation of identifiers, cell aggregation corresponds to binary minimization of
a logical ’OR’ expression composed of the terms that represent cell identifiers. As a
result, instead of using a distinct token (i.e., HVE pattern) for each cell, we can use
token aggregation and reduce the number of predicates that need to be tested. If two
cells are in the same alert zone and their identifiers differ in just one bit, then a ’*’
can be used instead of that bit, similar to a wildcard in binary minimization. The newly
obtained token is faster to generate and evaluate, because according to the operations
described in Appendix A, only the positions in the pattern vector where the value is not
’*’ need to be considered (i.e., those in set J). If all of the four partitions belonging to
the same quadtree node are in the same alert zone, then they can all be aggregated to
the identifier of their parent. In our implementation, in order to generate HVE pattern
vectors with aggregation, we use the binary expression minimization tool Espresso [32].
Consider for instance the example from Figure 6, where the alert zone is composed
of seven cells. All four cells whose identifiers have prefix 10 are in the zone, hence they
can all be aggregated to TK1 = 10∗∗. Also, cells on the last vertical line can be aggre-
gated to TK2 = 1∗1∗. Finally, cells 0010 and 1010 can be aggregated to TK3 = ∗010.
Note that, although these tokens overlap, this does not introduce a correctness problem
at query (i.e., matching) time at the server. Furthermore, the monitoring server can eval-
uate them in order from the most general (highest number of ’*’s) to the most specific
one (lowest number of ’*’s). If one token evaluates to a Match on a particular cipher-
text, there is no need to evaluate the rest of the tokens, since it is clear that the user is in
the alert zone. In addition, creating overlapping tokens helps if these tokens have more
’*’ symbols in their HVEs, because the cardinality of set J (Eq. (1) in Appendix A)
decreases, hence query and token generation times decrease as well.
In summary, the hierarchical scheme works as follows:
Encryption. Users determine the binary identifier of the grid cell they are in, and
create an HVE index I with that representation, having width 2 log d, where d × d is
the grid size. The encryption is performed with respect to I . Since the grid parameters
are public, the user can easily determine its enclosing cell and construct I .
Token Generation. For each alert zone z, the TA creates the set of binary codes
of cells within the zone. Next, it computes the minimized binary expression equivalent
to the logical ’OR’ of all codes in the set. For each resulting term in the minimized
expression, the TA creates a token, and the token will have a ’*’ symbol in each position
that was reduced during the minimization. All tokens are sent to the server.
Query. For every user and alert zone, the server S performs matching as follows:
S evaluates the encrypted user location against every token that represents the zone, in
8
Fig. 6: Hierarchical encoding and token aggregation
decreasing order of the number of ’*’ symbols in the token. In other words, tokens with
a higher number of ’*’s are considered first. If a Match is obtained, then the remaining
tokens for the zone are no longer considered. If a Non-Match is obtained for all tokens
in the zone, then the server concludes that the user is not inside the zone.
Even though the number of tokens increases compared to the baseline, the width of
each token is considerably smaller. In addition, the proportion of ’*’ symbols in a token
is much higher for the hierarchical scheme, due to aggregation. Finally, considering
tokens with a smaller J set first increases the chances of deciding on a Match without
having to consider all tokens of a zone. All these factors make the hierarchical encoding
perform much faster than the baseline, as we show in Section 6. Algorithm 3 provides
the hierarchical encoding pseudocode.
Algorithm 3: Hierarchical Encoding
1 p = ID of grid cell enclosing user u
2 A = set of grid cell IDs that make up the alert zone
User u: Set I = [I1 : I2 log2 d], s.t. ∀i, Ii ∈ {0, 1} and
∑2 log2 d
i=1 Ii · 2i−1 = p
User u: Send encrypted I to Server S
TA : Create initial token set TK = [TK1 : TK2 log2 d], where ∀a ∈ A, ∃T ∈ TK s.t.
∀i, Ti ∈ {0, 1} and∑2 log2 di=1 Ti · 2i−1 = a
TA : Reduce TK size by aggregating tokens within Hamming distance of 1
TA : Send encrypted TK to Server S
Server: If ∃T ∈ TK s.t. HV E Match(I, T ) = True, return Match; Else return
NotMatch
3.3 Gray Encoding
The performance gain of the hierarchical technique comes from the ability to combine
adjacent cells into a single search token with many ’*’ positions. In other words, the per-
formance improves when the binary minimization of the logical ’OR’ of cell identifiers
is more effective. However, in some cases, no aggregation can be performed between
two neighboring cells, as the Hamming distance between their identifiers is more than
1. As alert zones are composed of groups of neighboring cells, it is desirable to have
small Hamming distance between adjacent cell identifiers. To improve the effectiveness
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of the binary minimization step, hence to increase the number of ’*’ values in search to-
kens, we represent cell identifiers using Gray codes [1]. This way, cell identifier values
are assigned in such a manner that the Hamming distance between two adjacent cells is
always 1, hence binary minimization is facilitated.
A one-dimensional Gray code vector is determined using the following recursive
algorithm, where | represents the concatenation operator, andGk is the vector of a Gray
code instance at step k).
G1 = (0, 1)
Gk = (g1, g2, ...g2k)
Gk+1 = (0|g1, 0|g2, ..., 0|g2k , 1|g2k , ..., 1|g2, 1|g1)
For k = 3, the following Gray code vectors are obtained:
G1 = (0, 1)
G2 = (00, 01, 11, 10)
G3 = (000, 001, 011, 010, 110, 111, 101, 100)
Given a d × d grid, the length of the required Gray code necessary to represent
all cells is 2dlog2de. We employ a Gray code instance independently for each of the
two dimensions of the space, thus the identifier of a cell consist of the concatenation
between the Gray code value for the y axis and the x axis values. Similar to hierarchical
encoding, the scheme assumes a total number of cells that is a power of 4, but other
cases can be handled by padding.
Figure 7 illustrates the advantage of using Gray encoding instead of hierarchical
encoding for a 16-cell 4 × 4 grid. The alert zone consists of four cells. The two dig-
its leading each row in the Gray encoding diagram (Figure 7a) mark the two-bit prefix
shared by all the cell identifiers in that row. Conversely, the two digits on top of each
column mark the two-bit suffix of all the cell identifiers in that column. Using binary
minimization, the two tokens shown in the diagram are obtained, each of them having
one ’*’ symbol. Figure 7b shows how the hierarchical encoding behaves for the same
input. Due to the fact that moving from cell 1001 to 1100, or from 0011 to 1001 corre-
sponds to a Hamming distance larger than 1, no aggregation is possible between these
cell pairs. As a result, three tokens are necessary to represent this zone. Furthermore,
two of these tokens have no ’*’ symbol, leading to more expensive evaluation. As we
will show in Section 6, Gray encoding achieves more effective aggregation, especially
in the case of skewed data (e.g., Gaussian distribution of alert zones).
The phases of encryption and query for the Gray encoding method are similar to
their counterparts for the hierarchical encoding method of Section 3.2. The main dif-
ference is in the token generation phase, where the binary minimization is performed
according to the Gray code cell identifier binary representation. As we show in the
experimental evaluation (Section 6), using the Gray code representation can improve
performance by achieving more effective binary minimization. This in turn results in
either fewer tokens, or tokens with a larger proportion of ’*’ symbols.
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(a) Gray encoding (b) Hierarchical encoding
Fig. 7: Token Aggregation: Gray vs hierarchical encoding
4 Performance Optimizations
4.1 Preprocessing mathematical operations
As discussed in Appendix A, the HVE mechanism involves a large number of expo-
nentiations with very large integers which incur a significant computational cost. Fortu-
nately, many of these exponentiations are performed on a common base. For example,
if we take into consideration the encryption phase, in order to compute C
′
and C0, A
and V must be raised to the power of s. Even if s is chosen randomly for each run of
this step,A and V depend on the public key, which remains unchanged for long periods
of time (in commercial systems, re-keying can be done with frequency of once per year,
or even less often). Furthermore, when computing Ci,1, because the index attributes
consist of a vector of 0 and 1 values, the base of the power s can have only two values:
Hi or Ui ×Hi. Because both depend only on the public key, these two exponentiations
will always have a constant base. The same logic can be also applied to the exponenti-
ations for token generation. By employing preprocessing on each of these fixed bases,
the exponentiations become a lot faster. The preprocessing can be done offline, and the
results used during online operation, leading to significant execution time savings.
When matching a token against an encrypted message, several pairing computa-
tions are performed. For a particular token, the values of K0, Ki,1 and Ki,2 remain
constant. When applying a pairing, Miller’s algorithm is used [33]. Typically, for each
such operation, it is required to compute several line equations. In [31] it is shown that
effective preprocessing can be used as long as the first parameter is constant because
the equations of the lines can be calculated and stored ahead of time. At runtime, the
coordinates of a given point are substituted into these precomputed expressions. Since
HVE requires symmetric elliptic curves, preprocessing can be also done for the second
parameter. Preprocessed information is stored with each token and used by the server
to improve the time of each pairing. Preprocessing each token must be done only when
the tokens are generated at the trusted authority.
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4.2 Parallelization
The server is monitoring a large number of users, and may receive a large number of
alert zones. This creates a considerable load on the server. However, we emphasize that
the processing of a message from a user can be done independently from messages orig-
inating at other users. Furthermore, even for the same user, the matching for different
alert zones are completely independent operations. This presents a great potential for
parallelization. In fact, the problem is embarrassingly parallel, and significant execution
time improvements can be obtained by using several CPUs for matching. Nowadays,
even off-the-shelf desktop computers have multiple cores. Commercial cloud services
typically have hundreds or thousands of CPUs available for computation. Due to the
parallel nature of the problem, the speedup is expected to be close to linear, and the
resulting system scales very well as the number of CPUs involved grows.
We consider a message-passing parallel computing paradigm, which is favored by
the fact that only a small amount of data needs to be shared among distinct CPUs. One
master process coordinates all other slave processes. The master process distributes to
the slaves the search tokens. Then, as encrypted updates from users arrive, the master
receives the requests and dispatches them to slaves. Load balancing can be easily im-
plemented at the master level, which keeps track of the status of all slave processes. No
communication is required between slave processes, and the master-slave communica-
tion is required only at the start and end of each task. Furthermore, distinct messages
originating from the same user can be processed on different CPUs without any loss
in correctness or performance (i.e., no state maintenance is required). After processing
is done, if the token evaluated successfully, a response action can be taken by the pro-
cessing CPU, or the event can be sent to a central server responsible only with handling
what to do in case of a successful match.
5 Privacy-Performance Trade-off through Alert Zone Expansion
So far, we considered that alert zones are a fixed input to the system, and we provided
data encodings and optimizations to reduce computational overhead under this con-
straint. Since alert zones were not modified, we maintained the amount of location dis-
closure to a minimum, i.e., an adversary could only learn whether a specific ciphertext
corresponded to a location inside the alert zone or not. In this section, we consider a re-
laxation of the alert zone extent in order to improve performance. Specifically, given an
input alert zone, we investigate whether it is possible to slightly enlarge it such that the
resulting set of tokens needed to implement secure notification requires fewer bilinear
pairings to evaluate.
To maintain the level of additional disclosure low, we allow only a relatively small
enlargement factor, expressed as a ratio of the alert zone area, and quantified by a bound
parameter α. Given an enlargement factor α, our proposed alert zone expansion heuris-
tic determines an enlarged area with significantly lower processing overhead. In effect,
this proposed optimization trades a small amount of additional location disclosure for a
significant boost in matching performance. As a salient feature of this optimization, the
privacy-performance trade-off can be tuned using a single parameter (α).
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The optimization is deployed at the TA, which is in charge of generating search to-
kens. In an actual deployment, since the TA is trusted, it can perform additional steps to
check whether the enlarged zone is acceptable from a security standpoint, for instance
by comparing it against a set of pre-defined policies. In this paper, we only focus on
the performance aspect, and derive effective algorithms that quickly generate enlarged
search tokens (the policy aspect is outside our scope). Similar to optimizations from
prior sections, the zone expansion is guided by the objective of deriving tokens with
fewer non-wildcard elements, which results in less computation. The expansion tech-
nique assumes the same hierarchical data domain representation considered so far, and
works in conjunction with either hierarchical or Gray encodings.
We denote by base cell a cell in the leaf level of the hierarchical domain represen-
tation (recall that, the domain is split into d× d base cells, where d is a power of two).
The hierarchy has a number of 1+ log d levels. At level k, an aggregate cell consists of
2k × 2k base cells. Specifically, at the leaf level, numbered as k = 0, each cell is a base
cell, whereas at the top of the hierarchy (level log d) there is a single cell with size d×d
(expressed in terms of base cells). We identify a cell at level k by its coordinates within
that level: (x, y)k. The binary identifier of a cell consists of a binary string, which can
be immediately derived from its coordinates.
Algorithm 4 captures the main steps of the proposed heuristic alert zone expansion
technique. The input consists of expansion factor α and initial alert zone A. The heuris-
tic is given a maximum budget W = bα|A|c base cells that it can add to the initial
zone, where |A| is the area of the initial zone expressed in terms of base grid cells. The
output of Algorithm 4 is an expanded zone Aˆ such that |Aˆ| ≤ |A|+W and the number
of bilinear pairings required to evaluate Aˆ is lower than that of A.
The ExpandZone routine (Algorithm 4) works by considering each level
of the data domain hierarchy. An essential step of ExpandQuery is the
SelectPatchesSingleLevel routine (detailed in Algorithm 9) which finds
patches to add to the current set of zone cells (line 4). A patch (formally defined in
Section 5.1) is a set of cells added to the zone in a single iteration. If the new set of zone
cells, denoted as CrtZone, does not require more pairings than the current set of cells,
an expansion is made with the cells in the patch and we continue to the next level.
In order to prepare for the next level (lines [9-18]), parameters and indices are ad-
justed. Budget W is reduced by a factor of 4, since in the next level the size of one cell
is equal to 4 cells in the current level. Similarly, indices of zone cells are divided by
two. The intuition behind dividing the indices by two is that all 2 × 2 areas containing
zone cells in this level must be fully covered by the expansion, which means all cells in
those areas are in CrtZone. Algorithm 4 stops when one of the following conditions
is met: (i) the new set of zone cells increases the number of pairings; (ii) budget W is
exhausted; or (iii) the zone expands to the entire root level.
To illustrate the zone expansion algorithm, consider the example in Figure 8.
Zone cells are shown in grey color, and budget is set to W = 10. An area with
x ∈ [x1, x2], y ∈ [y1, y2] at level k is denoted as Rk[x1,x2]×[y1,y2]. Starting at level
k = 0 (Figure 8a), the 2 × 2 areas R0[4,5]×[0,1], R0[6,7]×[2,3], and R0[4,5]×[4,5] are consid-
ered for expansion. All six cells with diagonal stripes are added to the current set of
zone cells to fill those three areas. To prepare for expansion at the next level, the coor-
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Algorithm 4: ExpandZone
Input: expansion ratio α; alert zone A
Output: expanded alert zone Aˆ
1 W ← bα|A|c, B ← ∅
2 Aˆ← CrtZone← A
3 for k ∈ [0, . . . , log d] do
4 PSet ← SelectPatchesSingleLevel(W , d
2k
, CrtZone)
5 for p ∈ PSet do
6 for (x, y)k ∈ p.attached cells do
7 B ← B ∪ all base cells belonging to cell (x, y)k
8 if #pairing of (Aˆ ∪ B) ≤ #pairings of Aˆ then
9 Aˆ← Aˆ ∪ B
10 for p ∈ PSet do
11 W ←W − p.cost
12 for (x, y)k ∈ p.attached cells do
13 CrtZone← CrtZone ∪ (x, y)k
14 W ← bW
4
c
15 ifW ≤ 0 then
16 break
17 for (x, y)k ∈ CrtZone do
18 CrtZone = CrtZone \ (x, y)k ∪ (bx2 c, b y2 c)k+1
19 return Aˆ
dinate ids of zone cells must be adjusted for each 2 × 2 area. For example, for k = 1,
area R0[4,5]×[0,1] becomes cell (2, 0)1, area R
0
[6,7]×[2,3] becomes cell (3, 1)1 and so on.
The budget W is reduced to b 10−64 c = 1. Next, at level k = 1 (Figure 8b), the areas
R1[2,3]×[0,1] andR
1
[2,3]×[2,3] are considered for expansion.The cells with diagonal stripes
in range R1[3,3]×[0,0] (which equals R
0
[6,7]×[0,1] in the base grid) are added to the zone.
5.1 Patch Assembly
Next, we focus on the process of assembling patches at each level k of the data domain
hierarchy. A patch is a set of cells that can be combined with existing zone cells to
reduce the number of non-wildcard elements in a search token. We denote the cells be-
longing to a patch as attached cells, and the zone cells adjacent to the patch as attaching
cells. A patch is associated with a local cost and gain: the cost measures the increase
in alert zone area, whereas the gain quantifies the resulting reduction in bilinear pairing
operations when the patch is added to the zone.
We consider as patch candidate each 2 × 2 cell3 Rk[x,x+1]×[y,y+1] that satisfies the
following conditions: (i) has even x and y coordinates, (ii) contains at least one zone
cell, and (iii) has at least one non-zone cell. Revisiting the example in Figure 8a, the
area R0[4,5]×[0,1] composed of 2 × 2 base cells is a patch candidate. Note that, not all
3 We emphasize that, as patch candidates are considered at each level of the hierarchy, a patch
cell may include many base grid cells.
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(a) Level k = 0 (b) Level k = 1
Fig. 8: Example of expanding alert zone (in grey) at level k = 0 (a) and k = 1 (b). At
level 0, a total of 6 cells (illustrated with stripes) are added to obtain 3 fully-covered
areasR0[4,5]×[0,1],R
0
[6,7]×[2,3], andR
0
[4,5]×[4,5]. At level 1, four additional cells are added
to the area R1[2,3]×[0,1]. The final expanded alert zone contains all cells in R
0
[4,7]×[0,3]
and R0[4,5]×[4,5] (both grey and diagonally-striped cells in (b))
2 × 2 cell areas are valid candidates for patches. For instance, R0[5,6]×[0,1] has an odd
x; R0[6,7]×[0,1] does not contain any zone cell; and R
0
[4,5]×[2,3] does not contain any
non-zone cell.
For each valid patch candidate Rk[x,x+1]×[y,y+1], cells are indexed in a spiral order,
as shown in Figure 9a. We use this indexing order because it simplifies the process
of patch assembly, as will be described later in Section 5.2. In order to keep track of
zone and non-zone cells, a boolean arraymarked is maintained, such that marked [i] =
True if ith cell within Rk[x,x+1]×[y,y+1] is a zone cell, and marked [i] = False , other-
wise. Figure 9b shows a marked array for the area in Figure 9a. The marked array is
constructed by checking for each cell within the area whether or not it belongs to the
alert zone. The marking procedure is summarized in Algorithm 5.
(a) (b)
Fig. 9: (a) Cell indices within a 2× 2 patch; (b) Array marked for a 2× 2 patch.
Using the marked array, patch candidates are constructed such that one or more
non-zone cells can be attached to zone cells to reduce the number of pairings. Figure 10
shows several examples of patches for an area with 2 × 2 cells containing one, two, or
three zone cells. In each example, the non-zone cell (striped fill) is attached to the zone
cell (grey fill) to form a patch. Note that in Figure 10c, a striped cell can be attached to
either grey cell.
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Algorithm 5: MarkZoneCells
Input: zone cells A; start values x and y of area Rk[x,x+1]×[y,y+1]
Output: boolean array indicating which cells in 2× 2 block are zone cells
1 Initiate marked array with marked [i] = False, ∀i ∈ [0, 3]
2 foreach i ∈ [0, 3] do
3 if ith cell of Rk[x,x+1]×[y,y+1] ∈ A then
4 marked [i]← True
5 returnmarked
However, when the area contains only one zone cell, although there are three poten-
tial patches, only one of these is selected (Figure 10a). The reason is that if two patches,
each having a single zone cell, are selected, the number of pairings is not reduced; on the
other hand, if the patch with three zone cells is selected, there is no need to select other
patches with a single zone cell. Therefore, for each area, we construct patch groups that
include all potential patches such that no more than one patch can be selected from that
group. For example, in Figure 10a, there is only one patch group containing all three
patches; in Figure 10b and 10d, there is only one patch group containing one patch; in
Figure 10c, there are two patch groups, each containing one patch.
(a)
(b) (c) (d)
Fig. 10: Example of candidate patches for an area of size 2 × 2 (a) Three candidate
patches for an area with one zone cell; (b) One candidate patch for an area with two
zone cells; (c) Two candidate patches for an area with two zone cells; (d) One candidate
patch for an area with three zone cells.
The GetPatchGroupsInsideArea routine (Algorithm 6) shows the details
of constructing patches and patch groups. The algorithm handles separately each case
based on the number of zone cells in the area. For a single zone cell (line 3), similar to
the example in Figure 10a, one patch group is constructed which includes two patches:
one with one non-zone cell and another with all three non-zone cells. If there are two
zone cells (line 7), the algorithm further considers if those two zone cells are adjacent
or opposite (similar to Figure 10b and 10c, respectively) and either one or two patch
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groups are created, corresponding to the two situations. Finally, when there are three
zone cells (line 17), a single patch group is created.
Algorithm 6: GetPatchGroupsInsideArea
Input: array marked for 2× 2 cell block
Output: Patch groups with cell ids 0, 1, 2, or 3
1 Ginside ← ∅
2 num zone cells ← number of 1’s in marked
3 if num zone cells = 1 then
4 p1 ← new patch with an non-zone cell adjacent to the zone cell as attached cells and
the zone cell as attaching cells
5 p2 ← new patch with all three non-zone cells as attached cells and the zone cell as
attaching cells
6 Ginside ← {p1, p2}
7 else if num zone cells = 2 then
8 if two zone cells are adjacent then
9 p← new patch with all non-zone cells as attached cells and the zone cells as
attaching cells
10 Ginside ← {p}
11 else
12 p1 ← new patch with an non-zone cell adjacent to the first zone cell as
attached cells
13 p2 ← new patch with the other non-zone cell adjacent to the second zone cell as
attached cells
14 G1 ← {p1}
15 G2 ← {p2}
16 Ginside ← {G1, G2}
17 else if num zone cells = 3 then
18 p← new patch with all non-zone cells as attached cells and the zone cells as
attaching cells
19 Ginside ← {p}
20 return Ginside
At the end of Algorithm 6, each patch has its cells numbered from set {0, 1, 2, 3}. In
order to recover the original cell ids (i.e., the coordinates in current level k of hierarchy),
we use Algorithm 7, which takes as inputs a cell id i ∈ [0, 3] and the x, y values of the
area Rk[x,x+1]×[y,y+1], and utilizes the spiral index to recover the original values.
Next, we need to evaluate which patches are more desirable to use in the enlarged
zone, by computing the local cost and gain for each patch. Algorithm 8 takes as inputs
a candidate patch and the grid dimension dk at current level k. It outputs as cost the
number of attached cells (i.e., non-zone cells) of the patch (line 3). Effectively, the cost
measures the amount of enlargement of the expanded alert zone caused by this patch.
The gain measures the amount of saved computation: specifically, the number of search
token non-wildcards that are eliminated when we combine the attached cells with the
attaching cells for the current patch. There are two cases to consider when determining
the gain of the patch: (i) when only one cell is attached to form a 1 × 2 patch (line 4),
we can remove one non-wildcard element (line 5); (ii) when the entire 2 × 2 area is
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Algorithm 7: RecoverOriginalCoordId
Input: cell id i ∈ [0, 3]; x, y values of the area Rk[x,x+1]×[y,y+1]
Output: Original cell coordinates
1 if i = 1 or i = 2 then
2 x← x+ 1
3 if i = 2 or i = 3 then
4 y ← y + 1
5 return (x, y)
filled (line 6), the number of zone cells inside the area (i.e., n1) is further considered to
determine the gain. Specifically, when n1 = 3, the gain is larger (2 × k) since we can
remove a token in its entirety.
Algorithm 8: CalculateCostGain
Input: patch p; grid length at current level k;
Output: updated patch with cost and gain calculated
1 n1 ← number of zone cells of p
2 n2 ← number of non-zone cells of p
3 p.cost ← n2
4 if n1 + n2 = 2 then
5 p.gain ← 1
6 else if n1 + n2 = 4 then
7 if n1 = 1 then
8 p.gain ← 2
9 else if n1 = 2 then
10 p.gain ← 1
11 else
12 p.gain ← 2× k
13 return p
In the previous example from Figure 8a, there are three patch groups correspond-
ing to three areas: G1 for area R0[4,5]×[0,1], G2 for area R
0
[6,7]×[2,3], and G3 for area
R0[4,5]×[4,5]. The patches in each patch group along with their cost, gain, attaching cells,
and attached cells are shown in Table 1. For instance, to express areaR0[4,5]×[0,1] one can
look at patches p1 of G1, and use two tokens “00*110” and “00111*”, with a total of
10 non-wildcard elements. By adding one cell, only a single token “00*11*” is needed
to represent the area. Thus, the number of non-wildcard elements is reduced from 10 to
4, or an improvement of 6. The high gain when applying patch p1 results not only from
the number of non-wildcards reduced in one token, but also from the reduction in the
number of tokens (as one of the initial tokens is completely eliminated).
5.2 Patch Selection
Once we have the set of patches and patch groups, as well as their respective costs and
gains, we need a method to select the actual patches to expand the current alert zone.
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Patch Group Patch cost gain attached cells attaching cells
G1 p1 1 6 (5, 0) (4, 0), (4, 1), (5, 1)
G2
p2 1 1 (6, 2) (6, 3)
p3 1 1 (7, 3) (6, 3)
p4 3 2 (7, 2), (7, 3), (6, 2) (6, 3)
G3 p5 2 1 (4, 5), (5, 5) (4, 4), (5, 4)
Table 1: Example of candidate patch groups for expanding the alert zone at level k = 0.
Patch groups G1, G3 contain one patch, while patch group G2 contains 3 patches. No
more than one patch is selected per patch group.
Algorithm 9 outlines the patch selection process, which takes as inputs budget W , the
grid dimension at current level dk = d2k , and current alert zone Ak. It outputs a set of
patches PSet that has total cost at most W and maximizes the gain compared to other
candidate patches.
The selection algorithm works within an expanding search boundary de-
termined by the call to routine FindExpandingBoundary in line 1
(FindExpandingBoundary is summarized in Algorithm 10: the boundaries
consist of the maximum and minimum coordinate values of zone cells, and they always
have even values). Then, for each 2 × 2 area starting with even values (lines [3-6] in
Algorithm 9), if the current 2 × 2 area is a valid area to expand (line 8), the patches
and patch groups within this area are constructed (according to the procedure detailed
in Section 5.1). First, the cells that already belong to the current zone are marked by
calling Algorithm 5 (line 9). Then, using the marking information, the set Ginside of
patch groups within that area is constructed by calling Algorithm 6 (line 10). Next,
for each patch in the patch groups of Ginside , the original coordinate ids of cells in the
attaching and attached set of that patch are recovered by calling Algorithm 7 (line 13),
and the local cost and gain are calculated by calling Algorithm 8 (line 14). Finally, a
set of patches PSet is selected for expansion by calling Algorithm 11 (line 16).
The patches are selected such that the total cost is no more than W , the total gain
is maximized, and there is no more than one patch selected per group. This can be
modeled as a variant of a multiple-choice knapsack problem (MCKP) where a class in
MCKP is represented by a patch group, and we may choose a single item from a class,
instead of being required to choose at least one item. The reduction is as follows: Given
an instance of MCKP with capacity W , m classes, and each item j in class j having
cost ci,j and gain gi,j , for each class i, a new item j′ (or patch in our setting) is added
with cost ci,j′ = 0 and gain gi,j′ = 0. However, our patch selection problem is not NP-
hard, because W is restricted to a fraction of the alert zone, which in turn is restricted
to a fraction of the entire grid.
In our setting, each patch group contain either one or two patches. As a result, a dy-
namic programming approach for traditional binary knapsack problem can be used. Al-
gorithm 11 shows the dynamic programming solution that returns the selected patches
for expansion. In the example summarized in Figure 8 and Table 1, patches p1, p4, p5
are selected for expansion at level k = 0.
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Algorithm 9: SelectPatchesSingleLevel
Input: budget W ; grid dimension dk at level k; zone cells Ak
Output: patches with total cost ≤W and positive gain
1 min x ,max x ,min y ,max y ← FindExpandingBoundary(dk, Ak)
2 G ← ∅
3 x← min x
4 while x < max x do
5 y ← min y
6 while y < max y do
7 c← number of zone cells in this area Rk[x,x+1]×[y,y+1]
8 if 0 < c < 4 then
9 marked ← MarkQueryCells(Ak, x, y)
10 Ginside ← GetPatchGroupsInsideArea(marked)
11 for G ∈ Ginside do
12 for p ∈ G do
13 Recover original coordinate ids of each cell i in attaching cells and
attached cells using RecoverOriginalCoordId(i, x, y)
14 Update p← CalculateCostGain(p, dk)
15 G ← G ∪G
16 PSet ← KnapsackForGroups(W,G)
17 return PSet
Algorithm 10: FindExpandingBoundary
Input: Grid length dk; zone cells Ak
Output: the boundary for expansion
1 (min x ,max x ,min y ,max y) = minimum bounding rectangle of Ak expanded to even
coordinates
2 returnmin x ,max x ,min y ,max y
5.3 Complexity Analysis
The complexity of the alert zone expansion (Algorithm 4) depends on the complexity
of the binary minimization step (line 7) in which the algorithm decides whether or
not to continue expansion. In the worst case, Algorithm 4 needs to expand through all
log d levels of the hierarchy, and in each level its invokes Algorithm 9 and the binary
minimization procedure (in our implementation, we use the Espresso tool [32]).
Since Algorithm 9 finds the patch groups within the boundary of the query, and
the size of the alert zone is often much smaller than the size of the data domain, we
formulate the complexity of Algorithm 9 based on the alert zone size. Let Pk = |Ak| be
the number of cells of the alert zone at level k. After finding patch groups, Algorithm 9
invokes the dynamic programming solution in Algorithm 11 to select patches. In the
worst case, the number of patch groups Ng at level k equals the number of cells Pk of
the alert zone. In our setting, there are only one or two patches in each patch group.
Hence, the complexity of Algorithm 11 becomes O(NgW ) = O(αP 2k ) since W =
αPk. Thus, the complexity of Algorithm 9 is O(Pk + αP 2k ).
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Algorithm 11: KnapsackForGroups
Input: capacity W ; groups of Ng patches G = {G1, G2, . . . , GNg};
Output: patches with total cost ≤W , total gain is maximized, and each patch belongs to
a different group
1 K ← matrix of size (W + 1)× (Ng + 1)
2 for i ∈ [0, Ng] do
3 for w ∈ [0,W ] do
4 if i = 0 or w = 0 then
5 K[i][w]← 0
6 else
7 K[i][w]← K[i− 1][w]
8 for p ∈ Gi do
9 if p.cost ≤ w then
10 K[i][w]← max(K[i][w], p.gain +K[i− 1][w − p.cost ])
11 PSet ← ∅
12 i← Ng
13 w ←W
14 while 0 < K[i][w] do
15 for p ∈ Gi do
16 if p.cost ≤ w andK[i][w] = p.gain +K[i− 1][w − p.cost ] then
17 PSet ← PSet ∪ {p}
18 w ← w − p.cost
19 return PSet
However, since the value of Pk is divided by a factor of 4 each time k increases, the
complexity of the alert zone expansion (Algorithm 4) becomesO(P0+αP 20 +TEs((1+
α)P0) log d) where P0 is the size of the zone at the base level (i.e., original grid) and
TEs(t) is the time to run the binary minimization procedure for t inputs.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented a Python prototype of the proposed HVE-based location-based alert
system and performance optimizations. We have used as dataset the city of Oldenburg,
and generated user movements using Brinkhoff’s IAPG Network-based Generator of
Moving Objects4 [7]. We generated alert zones within the boundaries of the dataset
domain according to two distributions: uniform and Gaussian. We vary the percentage
of space covered by alert zones compared to the entire dataspace extent from 1% to
10%, and we denote this parameter as coverage. We consider a regular grid partitioning
the two-dimensional space with size ranging from 16 to 1024. The HVE cryptographic
functions were implemented using the Gnu MP v6.1.2 library and the Pairing-Based
Cryptography v0.5.14 library5. We use key lengths of 768, 1024 (default value), 1280
and 1536 bits. The experimental testbed consisted of a Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9980XE
4 http://iapg.jade-hs.de/personen/brinkhoff/generator/
5 Available online at http://gmplib.org/ and http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
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Fig. 11: Baseline encoding results
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Fig. 12: Hierarchical encoding results on uniform data
CPU (3.00GHz) with 18 cores and 128GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. All
code was written in Python 3.6.9.
6.1 Baseline Evaluation
Figure 11 shows the execution time results obtained for token generation, encryption
and query. The times presented are for a single operation, and present the average value
obtained for a particular grid size and percentage of the area covered by alert zones
(each percentage value has a different line in the graphs). First, we note that the cover-
age does not have a significant effect on the execution time, because the width of the
HVE obtained is so large that the associated overhead overshadows the influence of
the additional ’*’ symbols obtained as the area of alert zones grows. Second, it can be
observed that the values obtained are very large, and clearly not acceptable in practice.
Token generation can take up to 35 seconds. Although expensive, it can be argued
that the TA does not execute this phase very often (only when a new alert zone occurs),
hence its performance is not critical. However, encryption is very frequent, and it is ex-
ecuted at the resource-constrained mobile users. It can take up to 8 seconds to generate
a single encrypted update on a high-end CPU (in practice, this would be executed on
a mobile phone). Furthermore, the time required at the server to process a single user
update (i.e., perform matching against all alert zones) can reach 40 seconds.
6.2 Hierarchical and Gray Encoding
Figures 12 and 13 show the comparison results for uniform and Gaussian alert zone
distributions, respectively. Hierarchical encoding clearly outperforms the baseline, es-
pecially in terms of encryption time. The maximum time required for encryption is less
than 0.2 seconds, in contrast with 8 seconds for the baseline (Figure 11b). Recall that
alert zones do not influence encryption, so the hierarchical encoding lines present in
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Fig. 13: Hierarchical encoding results on Gaussian data
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Fig. 14: Gray vs. hierarchical encoding on Gaussian data
Figure 12b overlap. Encryption is also independent of alert zone distribution, so we do
not show encryption in Figure 13.
In terms of token generation and query time, the gain in performance is higher
for the Gaussian distribution, since there is more potential for token aggregation. The
reason is that minimization of binary expressions of cell identifiers is more effective
when zones are clustered, which is likely to be the case in practice.
As expected, execution time is higher for finer-grained grids. However, as opposed
to the baseline, in the case of hierarchical encoding the coverage has a significant effect
on token generation and query performance, as more alert zone cells translate into a
larger number of tokens. Still, the variation with coverage is sublinear, due to the good
effectiveness of the aggregation strategy employed (note how when coverage doubles
from 2% to 4% for uniform data and largest grid size, the query time increases only by
25%). Although the absolute execution times are still high, hierarchical encoding signif-
icantly outperforms the baseline. Later in Section 6.3 we show how optimizations can
be used to further cut down the performance overhead. For the rest of the experimental
evaluation, we will omit the baseline results.
Next, we evaluate the effect of using Gray encoding on performance. Recall from
Section 3.3 that using Gray codes provides better potential for aggregation, thus reduc-
ing the number of required tokens and/or increasing the proportion of ’*’ symbols in
a token. For uniform data (graph omitted due to space considerations), both encodings
perform similarly, without a clear winner, due to the fact that the aggregation potential
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Fig. 15: Effect of preprocessing on uniform data
is equal in the two cases. On the other hand, for Gaussian data (Figure 14) where alert
zones are clustered, Gray encoding favors aggregation of cells. For clarity, to keep the
number of lines in the graph low, we present the ratio between the execution time of
Gray divided by that of hierarchical encoding. Lower values of the ratio correspond to
higher gains for the Gray encoding. In practice, as alert zones are likely to be clustered,
Gray can bring significant performance benefits, of up to 60%.
6.3 Optimization Effect
We evaluate the performance of the proposed techniques when incorporating the perfor-
mance optimizations discussed in Section 4. First, we show the effect of incorporating
preprocessing to pre-compute and re-use some of the results to expensive mathematical
operations, such as exponentiations with large numbers. Figure 15 present the absolute
token generation and query times for both proposed encoding techniques on uniform
data and two values of the alert zone coverage, namely 2% and 4% (Gaussian data re-
sults show similar trends, so we omit them for brevity). Token generation computation
requirements are improved by roughly 25 − 30%. As the coverage increases, more to-
kens are required to represent a zone, so the generation time increases. We believe that
such times are reasonable in practice, especially since creation of alert zones is not a
frequent event in the system operation. In terms of querying, the execution times are
approximately cut in half compared to the non-optimized case (Figures 12 and 13).
Figure 16 presents the behavior of hierarchical encoding with preprocessing when
varying encryption key length. We show results for two different grid granularities and
coverage values, with Gaussian zone distribution. As expected, the performance de-
creases when key length increases. However, the 1024-bit setting, which according to
industry standards is sufficient for securing individuals’ information, does not incur a
steep increase in performance overhead. Gray encoding results exhibit similar behavior.
Figures 17 and 18 present the results when employing the parallel processing opti-
mization. We used 2, 4 and 8 CPUs for computation. We considered both variable grid
size for a fixed coverage of 6%, as well as variable coverage of alert zones for a fixed
grid size of 256. The results show that a close-to-linear speedup can be obtained. For
8 CPUs for instance, the speedup is 7.2. This is a very encouraging outcome, and the
query time is this way reduced to less than one second in the worst case. For median-
scale settings of the grid size and coverage, we obtain absolute execution times of under
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0.1 seconds per query. We emphasize that, although we only had available 8 CPUs for
testing, the problem studied is embarrassingly parallel in nature, so the availability of a
larger number of CPUs is likely to lead to close-to-linear speedup values as well.
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Fig. 16: Hierarchical encoding results for Variable Key Length, Gaussian data
6.4 Alert Zone Expansion Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance gain obtained by the alert zone expansion
heuristic introduced in Section 5. We use the same settings as in the previous experi-
ments, except that we allow a finer-grained partitioning of the space, to better evaluate
the impact of the expansion heuristic. Specifically, we consider grids of granularity
d × d, where d ∈ {64, 128, 256}, resulting to a total number of grid cells of 4096,
16384 and 65536, respectively. We keep the same alert zone size ranging from 1% to
10% of data space size, but we consider three distinct shapes: square, rectangular (with
a skew ratio of 2.5), and circular. The latter case is used to capture scenarios where
there is an event epicenter, and individuals are notified if they are situated within a cer-
tain Euclidean distance of it. The resulting circular zone is mapped to the grid. This
is representative for cases when mobile users are alerted to stay away from a danger-
ous location (e.g., a toxic gas spill). The alert zone expansion ratio α is varied within
set {0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08,0.10} (recall that a larger value results in a more significant
privacy leakage, but is also likely to yield a higher performance gain).
Fig. 19 shows the performance gain of expansion when varying the size of the initial
alert zone. For ease of presentation, the gain is expressed as improvement factor (×),
i.e., the ratio between the matching time when there is no enlargement over the matching
time when enlargement is used (a higher value represents a better performance gain).
Each line in the graph corresponds to a different grid granularity d. First, we note that
enlargement always results in improvement (the value is always greater than 1). Second,
the improvement factor shows a general increasing trend with alert zone size (except for
some random outcomes). This is explained by the fact that the enlargement factor α is
expressed as a percent of initial alert zone size. When the initial alert zone is larger,
the heuristic can select patches from more candidate cells. Finally, the improvement
factor is larger for finer granularity cases (i.e., larger d). This is also due to the fact
that the heuristic has more candidate patches to choose from. A finer granularity also
allows the search boundary to advance slightly more. When cells are larger, including
an extra cell may cause the α threshold to be exceeded, so the heuristic will not consider
that cell for enlargement. We also note that the shape of the zone impacts significantly
the gain. Specifically, a circular zone is better for expansion, since the heuristic does
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Fig. 17: Parralel results on uniform data
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Fig. 18: Parralel results on Gaussian data
not favor any particular expansion direction. When the initial zone is circular (or to be
precise, a circle aligned to the grid), the heuristic can bring into the zone cells from
all directions, and therefore the amount of possible choices is increased. The zone is
also likely to grow uniformly in all directions, leading to more compact tokens due to
the binary representations of cells. Conversely, the rectangular case, which leads to the
most skewed zones in terms of shape, performs the worst.
Fig. 20 shows the improvement factor when varying the enlargement factor α. As
expected, there is a clear increasing trend in execution time improvement. Since more
cells are available as patch candidates, the heuristic is able to either completely elim-
inate some tokens, or significantly increase the number of wildcards in the remaining
tokens through binary minimization. As in the previous experiment, we note that an
increase in granularity d results in a higher improvement factor. Also, when the ini-
tial alert zone is circular, the highest improvement is obtained, with values of up to 9
times. The gain is less pronounced for rectangular alert zones, but the heuristic is still
providing significant gains, with an improvement factor of up to 3 times.
In our final experiment, we measure the execution time of the zone enlargement
heuristic. Fig. 21 and Fig. 22 show the time required to compute the enlarged zone
when varying initial alert zone size and enlargement factor α, respectively. An interest-
ing trade-off emerges: as the granularity of the grid increases (i.e., finer grained grids),
the improvement in token matching time increases (as seen in previous experiments),
but at the same time the computation time for the enlarged zone grows. Furthermore,
we emphasize that the token matching computational overhead can be parallelized,
whereas zone enlargement computation is sequential in nature. The main reason why
the zone enlargement computation is high for finer granularities is the quadratic increase
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Fig. 19: Zone expansion improvement vs alert zone coverage
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Fig. 20: Zone expansion improvement vs expansion factor α
in patch candidates, coupled with the relatively slow binary expression minimization
step. Among different zone shapes, the circular shape takes the longest, due to the fact
that it considers the most patch candidates within the given enlargement threshold α.
Nevertheless, we note that for coarser and moderate granularities (d = 64 and
d = 128), the enlargement process is fast (less than half a second). Coupled with
the significant improvement factors (ranging from 2 to 4 for granularities coarser than
d = 256, as can be observed from Figs. 19 and 20), the heuristic can lead to very good
overall execution time improvements. Furthermore, the enlargement cost is done once
per zone, and remains the same regardless of the number of mobile users (i.e., cipher-
texts to match against). Hence, as the user population grows, the performance gain of
the heuristic (which is always a factor of the original zone evaluation time) will lead
to linear gains in the number of users, whereas the enlargement computation overhead
stays constant. We conclude that, overall, the zone enlargement heuristic is effective in
reducing the matching overhead, even for small values of enlargement (i.e., only a small
amount of privacy needs to be traded off for significant performance gains).
7 Related work
Location Privacy. A significant amount of research focused on the problem of private
location-based queries, where users send their coordinates to obtain nearby points of
interest. Early work attempted to protect locations of real users by generating fake lo-
cations. For instance, in [27] the querying user sends to the server k − 1 fake locations
to reduce the likelihood of identifying the actual user position. However, fake locations
can be detected using filtering techniques, which leaves the real users vulnerable.
A new direction of research started by [20] and continued by [14, 25, 34] relies
on the concept of Cloaking Regions (CRs). CR-based solutions implement the spatial
k-anonymity (SKA) [25] paradigm. For each query, a trusted anonymizer service gen-
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Fig. 21: Zone expansion time vs alert zone coverage
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Fig. 22: Zone expansion time vs expansion factor α
erates CRs that contain at least k real user locations. If the resulting CRs are recipro-
cal [25], SKA guarantees privacy for snapshots of user locations. However, supporting
continuous queries [8] requires generating large-sized CRs. In [10, 21], the objective is
to prevent the association between users and sensitive locations. Users define privacy
profiles [10] that specify their sensitivity with respect to certain feature types (e.g., hos-
pitals, bars, etc.), and every CRs must cover a diverse set of sensitive and non-sensitive
features. In [26], the set of POI is first encoded according to a secret transformation
by a trusted entity. A Hilbert-curve mapping (with secret parameters) transforms 2-D
points to 1-D. Users (who know the transformation key) map their queries to 1D, and
the processing is performed in the 1-D space. However, the mapping can decrease result
accuracy, and the transformation may be vulnerable to reverse-engineering.
The problem with CR-based methods is that the underlying k-anonymity paradigm
is vulnerable to background knowledge attacks. This is particularly a problem in the
case of moving users, since trajectory information can be used to derive the identities
behind reported locations. More recently, differential privacy [12], a provably secure
model for semantic privacy, has been used for spatial data in [9]. However, differential
privacy is only suitable for aggregate releases of data, and cannot handle processing of
individual updates, as required by an alert system.
Closer to our work, a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol is proposed
in [16] for nearest-neighbor queries. The protocol is provably secure, and also uses
cryptography. However, it considers a ’pull-based’ approach, and assumes that the user
already knows the location s/he wants to retrieve points of interest from. In contrast,
our focus is on a ’push-based’ notification service, where the PIR solution cannot be
applied since the user is not aware of where the alert zones are.
Since the publication of [18], several works addressed processing on encrypted loca-
tion data. In [37] and [22], two solutions are proposed for search on encrypted location
28
data hosted at a cloud server. Both approaches rely on symmetric searchable encryption
(SSE), where the client has access to the secret key of the transformation. The Fast-
Geo system [38] builds upon the concepts introduced in [37] and supports faster search
under the same trust assumptions. However, the SSE setting is not appropriate in our
problem setting, where large populations of mobile users subscribe to location-based
alerts. If a single user colludes with the service provider, the security of the entire set
of locations is compromised. This is a strong trust assumption, suitable for cases where
there are relatively few clients, who can be throughly vetted. Our solution relies on
asymmetric encryption, and mobile users only have access to the public key, which is
used for encryption. No user is able to compromise the privacy of other participants.
Furthermore, all the above solutions build an index on encrypted data to speed up
search performance. As shown in [39], the index structure can leak a lot of sensitive
details about the data, even when fully encrypted (e.g., data distribution, or relative
distance order among users). A similar approach that builds an R-tree on location data
protected using homomorphic encryption is proposed in [28], with emphasis on IoT
data, and on parallelizing computation in big data environments. The work in [29] is a
position paper that looks at how some concepts similar to search on encrypted locations
can be used for biomedical data, and also identifies other interesting type of queries that
may be of interest, such as skyline queries.
A significant body of research focused on nearest-neighbor (NN) queries on en-
crypted data [13,23,24], culminating with the work in [39] which showed that the most
secure and efficient way to answer NN queries on encrypted data is through material-
ization of results and encryption of the resulting structure. All these works consider the
symmetric encryption setting, hence they rely on trust assumptions that are too strong
for our proposed location alert system.
Searchable Encryption. One of the earliest works that coined the concept of
searchable encryption was [36], which proposed provably secure cryptographic tech-
niques for keyword search. Only exact matches of keywords were supported. Later
in [5], the set of search predicates supported was extended to comparison queries. How-
ever, the resulting solution could not be easily extended to conjunctions of conditions,
without a considerable increase in ciphertext and token size. The work in [6] further
extended the set of supported predicates to subset queries, as well as conjunctions of
equality, comparison and subset queries with small ciphertext and token size. The au-
thors of [6] also introduced HVE, which we employ as a building block in our solutions
for private location-based alert systems. HVE protects the privacy of the encrypted mes-
sages received from users, but assumes that the token information (e.g., alert zones) is
public. The more recent work in [2] extends HVE to also protect the tokens. However,
the solution is more expensive.
8 Conclusion
We proposed a system for secure location-based alerts which utilizes searchable en-
cryption. We introduced two alternate data encodings that allow efficient application of
cryptographic primitives for search on encrypted data (namely HVE). Furthermore, we
devised performance optimizations that reduce the overhead of searchable encryption,
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which is notoriously expensive. We also devised a heuristic that enlarges alert zones by
a small factor in order to reduce matching time, thus achieving a tunable performance-
privacy trade-off. The experimental evaluation results show that searchable encryption
can be made practical with careful system design and optimizations.
In future work, we plan to investigate more advanced data and query encoding tech-
niques (beyond regular grids) that will allow us to securely alert users with even lower
overhead. We also plan to study other types of matching semantics beyond range queries
(e.g., nearest-neighbors, top-k).
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A Primer on HVE Encryption
HVE is built on top of a symmetrical bilinear map of composite order [4], which is a
function e : G×G→ GT such that ∀a, b ∈ G and ∀u, v ∈ Z it holds that e(au, bv) =
e(a, b)uv . G and GT are cyclic multiplicative groups of composite order N = P · Q
where P andQ are large primes of equal bit length. We denote byGp,Gq the subgroups
of G of orders P and Q, respectively. Let l denote the HVE width, which is the bit
length of the attribute, and consequently that of the search predicate. HVE consists of
the following phases:
Setup. The TA generates the public/secret (PK/SK) key pair and shares PK with
the users. SK has the form:
SK = (gq ∈ Gq, a ∈ Zp, ∀i ∈ [1..l] : ui, hi, wi, g, v ∈ Gp)
To generate PK, the TA first chooses at random elements Ru,i, Rh,i, Rw,i ∈ Gq,∀i ∈
[1..l] and Rv ∈ Gq . Next, PK is determined as:
PK = (gq, V = vRv, A = e(g, v)
a,
∀i ∈ [1..l] : Ui = uiRu,i, Hi = hiRh,i, Wi = wiRw,i)
Encryption uses PK and takes as parameters index attribute I and message M ∈
GT . The following random elements are generated: Z,Zi,1, Zi,2 ∈ Gq and s ∈ Zn.
Then, the ciphertext is:
C = (C
′
=MAs, C0 = V
sZ,
∀i ∈ [1..l] : Ci,1 = (U Iii Hi)sZi,1, Ci,2 =W si Zi,2)
Token Generation. Using SK, and given a search predicate encoded as pattern
vector I∗, the TA generates a search token TK as follows: let J be the set of all indices
i where I∗[i] 6= ∗. TA randomly generates ri,1 and ri,2 ∈ Zp,∀i ∈ J . Then
TK = (I∗,K0 = ga
∏
i∈J
(u
I∗[i]
i hi)
ri,1w
ri,2
i ,
∀i ∈ [1..l] : Ki,1 = vri,1, Ki,2 = vri,2)
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Query is executed at the server, and evaluates if the predicate represented by TK
holds for ciphertext C. The server attempts to determine the value of M as
M = C
′
/(e(C0,K0)/
∏
i∈J
e(Ci,1,Ki,1)e(Ci,2,Ki,2) (1)
If the index I based on which C was computed satisfies TK, then the actual value of
M is returned, otherwise a special number which is not in the valid message domain
(denoted by ⊥) is obtained.
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